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ABSTRACT 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in 
major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present.  Changes 
include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and 
approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical 
tools available to inspectors.  In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to 
strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-
Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of 
safeguards.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The IAEA safeguards system has undergone continued change in focus, scope, and 
capability from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present.  Its initial focus 
was primarily on detecting the diversion of declared nuclear material, but events in Iraq 
in 1991 demonstrated that a broader approach was needed.  These events initiated a series 
of changes, which: clarified existing authorities; broadened the scope and type of 
information required to be reported (ranging from R&D not involving nuclear material to 
exports of non-nuclear material); and defined a new type of access, complementary 
access, which provides additional assurance of the absence of undeclared activities at 
declared locations but can potentially take place at any location in a State. 
 
In terms of existing authorities, especially important steps were: (1) the affirmation by the 
Board of Governors that safeguards under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) 
should ensure the “correctness and completeness” of states’ declarations and be designed 
to provide “credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared 
activities and of the absence of any undeclared activities;” and (2) reaffirmation by the 
Board of Governors of the Agency’s right to undertake special inspections, while at the 
same time anticipating that their use “should be rare.” 
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 The most important new authorities, including complementary access and the reporting of 
nuclear fuel cycle information, were incorporated in the Model Additional Protocol (AP) 
(INFCIRC/540), which also established a well-defined process for resolving “questions” 
or “inconsistencies” about the completeness and correctness of States’ declarations and 
for obtaining complementary access. 
 
In legal terms, the IAEA has moved from INFCIRC/66 safeguards agreements, which 
apply safeguards to specific listed items; to CSA, which apply safeguards to all nuclear 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities; to CSA plus an AP, which together cover the 
full peaceful nuclear fuel cycle and include complementary access rights whose purpose 
includes detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities. 
 
This evolution has led to a comparable transformation in the ways in which safeguards 
are implemented and conclusions are drawn and reported.  New safeguards processes 
pose challenges for the inspectorate to acquire, analyze, and assess information in a 
credible and cost-effective manner.   They also place new demands on States, which 
under the expanded declaration of the AP must provide the IAEA with more information, 
including types of information not previously included in a traditional State System of 
Accounting and Control (SSAC) for nuclear material.    
 
Revelations about clandestine networks that traffic in proliferation-sensitive equipment, 
materials, and information demonstrate that many states not considered as “supplier 
states” can, in fact, contribute to proliferation.  They also demonstrate the importance of 
adopting appropriate controls in order to help reduce the risk of proliferation.     
 
Events in Iraq in the 1990s and, more recently, in Libya, Iran, and Syria also highlight the 
importance that IAEA have robust capabilities to investigate violations of safeguards 
agreements.  In addition, where violations have been confirmed, the IAEA should be in a 
position to provide assurances that they have been rectified and to help to provide 
confidence over time that ostensibly peaceful nuclear activities are in fact so.   
 
Clearly, the risk of States violating the terms of safeguards agreements is not 
hypothetical.  States might also violate provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT) beyond those dealing with safeguards. The very real possibility also exists, e.g., 
DPRK, that states can withdraw from the NPT.  While the IAEA is not charged with 
detecting or rectifying violations of the NPT, other than in connection with its safeguards 
agreements, NPT withdrawal does raise important questions relevant to IAEA, especially 
if a State withdraws from the NPT while in violation of a safeguards agreement.  
 
INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS AND THE STATE-LEVEL APPROACH      
 
As the authorities of the safeguards system were clarified and expanded,  it has been 
particularly important for the IAEA to adopt new measures and approaches to provide 
assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a 
whole.  Integrated Safeguards (IS), i.e., using the optimal combination of safeguards 
measures available under both CSA and an AP, and the State-Level Approach (SLA) 
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 have emerged as natural concomitants of the transformation of safeguards described 
above, and their implementation poses new challenges. 
 
Under the IS concept, the Secretariat evaluates the compliance of a Member State with a 
CSA and an AP with a view to drawing the conclusion  that all nuclear material remains 
in peaceful activities in the State.   When such a conclusion is drawn, the Secretariat 
develops a specific IS approach for the State that takes advantage of the increased 
assurance of the absence of undeclared activities available from new measures to reduce 
field inspection effort, e.g., less frequent interim inspections, random selection of 
facilities to be inspected from a set of facilities, and lower detection probability goals.2   
 
Like IS, the SLA is intended to take best advantage of IAEA resources and to provide the 
IAEA with the flexibility needed to allocate them appropriately.  It moves beyond a 
facility-focused checklist system offering greater flexibility to deal effectively with the 
challenges of detecting undeclared nuclear materials and activities in a State.   
 
In contrast to the traditional check-list approach, the SLA builds on a careful and 
structured analysis of all aspects of an individual state’s nuclear activities and the nuclear 
weapon materials and technologies acquisition paths available to it that is embodied in 
the State Evaluation Report (SER).  The SLA envisions safeguards implementation via an 
Annual Implementation Plan (AIP) based on an SLA customized for each Member State.   
 
The SLA is information driven, with a uniform analytical process applied to all states (a 
nondiscriminatory approach in which the same safeguards objectives are applied to all 
states), but allows for non-uniform implementation of safeguards at similar facility types 
in different states. In other words, the aim of the SLA is to differentiate between states 
without discriminating against them.  
 
The state evaluation process documented in the SER provides the basis for adjustments to 
safeguards activities.  The following are examples of factors that might be taken into 
consideration when performing the evaluation that can lead to changes in safeguards 
activities for a particular Member State:  
 
1) Quality of the state system of accounting and control (SSAC),  
2) Willingness of the state and its nuclear facility operators to employ safeguards 
measures such as unattended and remote monitoring (UNARM) or short-notice 
random inspections (SNRI) with timely “mailbox” declarations, and  
3) Availability of information about the state’s nuclear activities (which can come 
from the state, from open sources such as the internet and satellite imagery, or 
from third parties).   
 
While information about specific States is not available, the Secretariat has suggested that 
overall reductions of the order of 15% of the in-field workload can be achieved.  On the 
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 other hand, the IAEA foresees that headquarters evaluation activities will increase by up 
to 50% by 2030.3  
 
Challenges 
Credibility and Transparency of the SLA:  Safeguards planning, implementation, and 
evaluation based on a technically sound and politically transparent SLA process will be 
essential to addressing the safeguards challenges of the future.  A well-developed and 
well-executed SLA/AIP/SER process will not only guide safeguards but also strengthen 
the overall nuclear material management regime in support of measures to combat 
nuclear terrorism and clandestine procurement networks.  It will also help to define the 
measures needed to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. The process needs 
careful definition, which must be communicated transparently and precisely to Member 
States in order to avoid creating the appearance that the IAEA safeguards system is 
discriminatory or ineffective.   This includes noting the differing levels of confidence 
regarding the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared materials and activities at declared sites 
versus anywhere in the State.  In addition, the three IAEA Operations Divisions should 
apply the SLA process using consistent procedures and standards. 
 
Strengthening and Broadening SSACs:  The strength of the IAEA’s conclusions depends 
importantly on the timeliness and completeness of States’ reporting to the IAEA of 
requisite information.  States should have in place effective legal and regulatory 
frameworks that require correct and complete reporting of their relevant activities.  But 
the broader Agency mission and the AP's expanded declaration poses a new challenge for 
the IAEA and for Member States.  For nuclear material reporting, the IAEA conducts 
independent measurements through which it can assess the quality of the SSAC for 
nuclear material.  How the IAEA should address the quality of the State’s reporting in 
other areas is not as straightforward.   Better understanding is needed of how the IAEA 
can establish confidence in the data elements of the expanded SSAC.  For many Member 
States, there is also the need to put in place or to strengthen the capacity to provide the 
necessary information to the IAEA.   The SLA/AIP/SER and Safeguards Implementation 
Report (SIR) processes should be reviewed to identify how best to use them to strengthen 
SSACs, including States’ abilities to meet their obligations under APs and to improve 
safeguards implementation.  In addition, there is a continuing need for States to provide 
information to the IAEA on a voluntary basis, as recommended by the Board of 
Governors.  Finally, there will be a continuing need to assess the information 
requirements of the IAEA and to adjust existing reporting arrangements as appropriate.    
 
Safeguards Resources:  The Agency faces both short- and long-term budget issues 
because of the increase in the number of facilities, the enlarged scope of safeguards (e.g., 
the AP, the new Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), SERs, etc.), and the possible 
application of new/additional safeguards in nuclear weapon states (NWS).  Analyzing 
and evaluating how to establish priorities for allocating safeguards resources to detecting 
diversion at declared facilities, detecting undeclared facilities, and implementing 
safeguards in NWS and, perhaps at additional facilities in India will remain a continuing 
challenge.   
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If there is a continued squeezing of resources, the IAEA will need to be particularly 
careful to avoid a number of risks, for example: reducing inspection effort at declared 
facilities in such a fashion that a clear link between inspection measures and conclusions 
is lost; incomplete coverage of credible diversion paths; or turning to dubious 
mechanisms (highly infrequent random inspections) to address declared facilities.  This is 
the downside of the flexibility allowed by the SLA.  
 
Implementation Issues:   In addition to these challenges, the emergence of a nuclear 
renaissance and a renewed interest in multinational fuel cycle centers raise the questions 
of how to use the SLA process to design safeguards approaches for sensitive fuel cycle 
facilities in the context of multinational fuel cycle centers and related concepts.  
 
SPECIAL INSPECTIONS 
 
As noted above, recent history has demonstrated the fact that States have failed to declare 
all of their nuclear activities.  Thus, important questions are: How should the IAEA 
respond to indications of undeclared activities? what are the tools available? how should 
such tools be deployed? and what steps could be taken to strengthen the ability of the 
IAEA to take advantage of them?   
 
For States with a CSA, one tool is the special inspection authority that is provided for in 
INFCIRC/153.  It permits the Agency to obtain “access in agreement with the State to 
information or locations” in addition to what is provided for in the safeguards 
agreement.4 The IAEA may carry out special inspections if it “considers that information 
made available by the State, including explanations from the State and information 
obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its 
responsibilities under the Agreement.”  An inspection “shall be deemed to be special,” 
when it is additional to routine inspection effort, or if it involves access to information or 
locations in addition to the access specified for ad hoc or routine inspections, or both.     
 
However, the IAEA has made use of special inspections only rarely.  One important 
reason is that compliance is the norm for almost all IAEA Member States, and resolution 
of anomalies or other safeguards concerns has been straightforward and successfully 
pursued on the basis of cooperation.  On the other hand, the Agency has had to 
investigate instances of undeclared activities where it could have used special inspections 
to gain more access and/or information but instead labeled its inspection activities as 
technical visits, verification missions, or transparency visits -- labels that are not backed 
up by a specific legal authority.  
 
Challenges 
No matter the reasons for their infrequent use, there is a concern that continued 
reluctance or failure to make use of special inspections, or the perception that the IAEA is 
unwilling to use them, could undermine the Agency’s ability to use them when needed, 
for example, in the event of serious violations.  This “fact” or perception could also 
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 undermine States’ willingness to cooperate with the Agency when it uses less formal 
methods.   
 
We believe the IAEA’s ability to conduct special inspections could be strengthened  if  
States were to view them as a straightforward tool for it to use whenever routine 
inspections do not suffice.  It is important to note in this connection that special 
inspections can be used to seek information and are not necessarily a request for access 
and that such requests might be more difficult to reject or deflect than less formal ones. 
The special inspection authority provides the only explicit, legal basis for requesting that 
a State provide information in addition to that which is required (even for States with an 
AP in force).  Also, special inspections might still be a necessary tool at undeclared 
locations in AP States because they might allow access inside, and information about, 
certain locations where CA would only allow specified verification activities with limited 
or no access.  Thus, the failure to make use of special inspections deprives the IAEA of a 
significant legal tool.   
 
NPT Withdrawal and Continuation of Safeguards 
Under Article X of the NPT, States Parties have the right to withdraw from the Treaty.  
When the withdrawal becomes effective, the relevant CSA as well as AP would 
terminate, and the formal obligations of the Treaty and the relevant NPT safeguards 
agreement no longer apply in that State.  Clearly such withdrawals, particularly following 
violations of the NPT, could pose risks to the nonproliferation regime, and steps should 
be considered that could reduce these risks.   
 
One key step is ensuring the continuation of safeguards in the event of withdrawal, which 
has been a topic of discussion during the NPT review process.  At a minimum, safeguards 
would need to be applied where there are obligations that survive NPT withdrawal.  
These obligations could stem from bilateral supply agreements or from INFCIRC/66 
safeguards agreements suspended following entry into force of an NPT CSA.  Beyond 
that, different views have been expressed about the continuation of safeguards:   
• Safeguards should continue on all imports to prevent the withdrawing State from 
taking advantage of those that it had acquired while it was a party to the NPT.  
• Based on the perspective that all of a State's nuclear activities would have 
benefited from its NPT adherence, a more robust approach would continue 
safeguards on all these activities at the time of withdrawal. 
• A somewhat different approach would be continuation of IAEA safeguards on 
sensitive material and facilities because unsafeguarded plutonium or HEU or the 
means to produce such material constitute a threat to international peace and 
security in the event of a State’s withdrawal from the NPT. 
 
In any event, all suppliers should endeavor to ensure that their cooperation does not 
support unsafeguarded nuclear activities in the event of a State’s withdrawal from the 
NPT.  To this end, all suppliers should incorporate in their bilateral supply arrangements 
a requirement that safeguards will be applied, even if an NPT safeguards agreement is 
terminated, under a new safeguards agreement on all transferred items and related 
technology transferred by the supplier or processed or produced or used in connection 
with such transfers.  (This is along the lines of para 4a of NSG guidelines.) Return of all 
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 such material in certain circumstances also needs to be included in supply arrangements, 
for example where appropriate safeguards arrangements could not be put in place. The 
UN Security Council and the Board of Governors of the IAEA might lend their weight to 
putting such arrangements in place. 
 
Challenges 
NPT Violation: A State that withdraws from the Treaty after violating its provisions 
should not be allowed to evade corrective action by the international community to 
deprive it of the benefits derived in violation of the Treaty while still a party to the NPT.  
While Parties have a right to withdraw from the Treaty, they do not have a right to profit 
from their violations.  A violation could already be under investigation or could be 
discovered after the withdrawal notification is received.5   There is strong support for not 
allowing a State to use withdrawal as a means to avoid accountability for its violations 
while a party to the Treaty.6   While the accountability would depend on specific 
circumstances, it could include return of imported items, termination of supply or 
technical cooperation arrangements, or other steps to be decided at the time.  NPT parties 
could insist on the continuation of IAEA safeguards until such time as the violation is 
redressed. 
 
Scope and Duration of Safeguards:  Regardless of which approach is considered, there is 
a need to define the desired scope of safeguards coverage.  For example, many bilateral 
commitments apply both to the supplied item and to items produced or manufactured 
through the use of the supplied item.  If accounting systems did not keep track of nuclear 
material by country of origin, it could be difficult to identify what items should be subject 
to safeguards. All supplier countries should insist on such accounting (as do Australia, 
Canada, and the US today). In the event of technology transfers, this could be even more 
difficult.  A similar challenge would exist in connection with imported items.  One way 
to reduce uncertainty would be for supply arrangements to include agreement that all 
facilities of the same type as the supplied facility would be deemed to be based on the 
supplied facility or technology.  Consideration would also need to be given to how to 
address any items that were procured illegally. 
 
In addition to the coverage of safeguards, the question of the duration of any continuing 
safeguards would need to be addressed.  Obligations that survive NPT withdrawal will 
generally call for safeguards that last indefinitely, at least until the items are consumed or 
become no longer relevant to safeguards.  In the other cases, ideally, coverage would be 
indefinite but consideration could be given to calling for safeguards for a fixed period of 
time, perhaps, ten years. 
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 The IAEA would have a continuing role if there were an outstanding safeguards violation 
at the time of withdrawal.  The IAEA would also get involved in the event that a supplier 
State sought the establishment of a backup IAEA safeguards arrangement; if the 
suspension of existing safeguards agreements were lifted; or should the Security Council 
mandate an IAEA review of a withdrawing State’s safeguards or NPT compliance.   
 
To demonstrate its readiness, the IAEA BOG could approve a policy document that 
outlines the IAEA’s authorities and responsibilities in the event of withdrawal, along with 
a list of ways the IAEA could assist in addressing the withdrawal action.  Among the 
actions listed could be the willingness of the IAEA to do a compliance review of 
safeguards.  The IAEA should also examine whether there are any suspended safeguards 
agreements that would be reactivated should the NPT safeguards agreement be 
terminated.  The IAEA could be available for consultations with any nation that has 
supplied items to the withdrawing State and could call a special BOG meeting to approve 
any alternative safeguards arrangements that may not already be in force.  The policy 
document could also outline the range of actions available to the BOG in the event a 
withdrawing State is in non-compliance with a safeguards agreement or is under 
investigation for possible non-compliance.  It could discuss the kinds of engagement with 
NPT parties, for example through the NPT Review Conference process, that would be 
appropriate. 
 
Conclusions 
There is no doubt that the significant changes seen in the IAEA safeguards system have 
strengthened its ability to provide important nonproliferation assurances to the 
international community.  Expanding the focus of the system to include the State as a 
whole is an important accomplishment, but challenges remain - technical, political, and 
institutional.  These include potentially new roles for IAEA in providing supply 
assurances and applying safeguards at multinational facilities in NWS.    
 
IAEA and Member States share the responsibility to ensure that the IAEA is in a position 
to draw appropriate conclusions that are technically sound and credible.  The design and 
implementation of integrated safeguards and State-Level Approaches need to take into 
account a broad array of factors in an objective and nondiscriminatory manner.   IAEA 
needs to ensure that it takes best advantage of the authorities that it has.   
 
IAEA performance depends on the cooperation of States.  All States should adopt 
Additional Protocols and bring required safeguards agreements into force.  All States 
should put in place the safeguards and security infrastructures needed to implement 
safeguards agreements effectively and efficiently and to reduce the risks of terrorism and 
illicit trafficking.  Only with robust cooperation that provides the IAEA with the 
information that it needs will all of the advantages of the State-Level Approach be 
realized. 
 
Consideration needs to be given to addressing the situation that would emerge after a 
State’s withdrawal from the NPT or its violation of a safeguards agreement.  Steps can be 
taken now that would mitigate risks. 
10 
 
